R. T. Mullins, THE END OF THE TIMELESS GOD by Rogers, Katherin
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 33 Issue 4 Article 9 
10-1-2016 
Mullins, THE END OF THE TIMELESS GOD 
Katherin Rogers 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Rogers, Katherin (2016) "Mullins, THE END OF THE TIMELESS GOD," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the 
Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 33 : Iss. 4 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol33/iss4/9 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and 
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
BOOK REVIEWS 495
There is much to commend in this book and it should attain a wide 
readership. Those already on the analytic theology scene, so to speak, will 
find McCall’s book a refresher on what makes analytic theology helpful. 
For those familiar with, but skeptical of, analytic theology, this book will 
go a long way in assuaging common reservations. But as an introductory 
text that carefully outlines the aims of analytic theology and illustrates the 
utility of analytic theology, this book will be of most use to seminarians, 
undergraduates, ministers, and interested laypersons. If analytic theology 
is to break into the mainstream of Christian theological reflection, then 
this is a book to help blaze that trail.
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The End of the Timeless God, by R. T. Mullins. Oxford University Press, 2016. 
Pp. xii + 248. $110.00.
KATHERIN ROGERS, University of Delaware
R. T. Mullins has written an ambitious book. He aims to explain the tradi-
tional view of divine timelessness (DT) expressed by classical theists such 
as Augustine, Boethius, Anselm, and Aquinas (among others) and then to 
show that Christians ought to reject it. Mullins makes a number of good 
points, both on the historical side of the project and on the philosophical 
side, but in the end the work is so ambitious that he is not able to develop 
his historical explanation or his philosophical rejection persuasively.
In the beginning (3–10) Mullins outlines what commitments a “Chris-
tian Research Program” must include. He proposes six, all of which (except 
perhaps that God literally takes on “obligations”) are happily accepted by 
classical theists. However, he leaves out a commitment that is important 
to many Christian philosophers, and certainly to classical theists; the basic 
thesis of Perfect Being Theology (PBT), that God must be perfect, unlim-
ited, that than which no greater can be conceived. A being than which we 
mere mortals can conceive a greater is not God. It is not clear whether 
Mullins allows that there could be a better being than the God arrived at 
by his version of a viable Christian Research Program.
In setting up his project, Mullins makes some helpful clarifications. In 
the last century or so the discussion about DT and—a necessarily related 
issue—the nature of time has often been cast in unhelpful language. For 
example (24–25), participants have often adopted McTaggart’s A-theory 
and B-theory as if they referred to the ontological nature of time, whereas 
in McTaggart’s original article they are about language. Mullins clarifies 
the contemporary debate explaining that it is mainly between presentists 
(only the present moment exists) and isotemporalists (all times are equally 
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existent). (Mullins uses the more standard term “eternalist” but, as I will 
note below, this can be misleading.) And Mullins makes the point that the 
disagreement is not over whether or not there is change. He rightly notes 
that both sides agree that things change (23).
However, Mullins’s statement of the motivation for positing a timeless 
God is incomplete. He associates the commitment to DT with the accep-
tance of the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS), and sometimes writes 
as if the former theory stands or falls with the latter. Historically, some 
versions of DDS entail DT, and some do not. Moreover, DT alone does not 
entail DDS, and there are other reasons to embrace DT besides accepting 
DDS. One might accept DT, along with isotemporalism, as the most ad-
equate way to solve the freedom/foreknowledge dilemma. Mullins barely 
mentions the dilemma in a page and a half at the end of the book under 
“Truthmaker Theory” (206–207). Perhaps a more fundamental reason for 
adopting DT along with isotemporalism is that PBT entails that God have 
the widest scope for the best sort of knowledge and power, that is, imme-
diate knowledge of, and power over, everything always. There is a con-
temporary debate over whether or not DT plus isotemporalism enhances 
divine knowledge and power, but since Mullins does not include PBT 
among his commitments, this motivation for DT and the ensuing debate 
are not mentioned.
Given what Mullins does say—he quotes scripture off and on through-
out—one suspects he might respond that his understanding of God and 
time is biblically based, and the Bible trumps PBT. But most classical the-
ists hold that, while the Bible is the inerrant word of God, it is not the 
best reference for metaphysics any more than for the natural sciences. On 
the question of how to interpret the Bible, classical theism holds that any 
interpretation that understands God as actually limited—He forgets, He 
makes mistakes, etc.—must be incorrect. Mullins does not present an ar-
gument for how and by whom biblical interpretation is to proceed.
Mullins (74–126) holds that all of the great classical theists—Augus-
tine, Boethius, Anselm, Aquinas (among others)—are committed to DDS, 
divine immutability, DT, presentism, and the view that God knows the 
future because He knows what He Himself will cause. Presenting this in-
terpretation and noting the connections between doctrines is useful. Mul-
lins argues that this is an incoherent set of commitments, since it entails 
that God cannot know what time it is now. And, on some readings of these 
doctrines, that criticism is telling. A problem is that Mullins’s historical 
examination is cursory. He offers a few texts and a few secondary sources 
and, regarding the latter, often not the most widely recognized experts.
Boethius left us a small body of work, and I believe Mullins is right 
about Boethius. He may be right about Augustine and Aquinas, but both of 
them bequeathed a huge corpus in which there are some texts that sound 
presentist and some that sound isotemporalist. Mullins’s quick glance 
does not inspire confidence that the former represents the true commit-
ment. Which view does the preponderance of texts represent? Could it be 
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that both philosophers unconsciously assumed presentism without con-
sidering other options, and so were not committed to presentism? Could it 
be that there is an important distinction between earlier and later works? 
Could it be that the presentist texts can be read as only quoad nos?
Anselm’s body of work is more manageable than Augustine’s or Thom-
as’s but he, too, says things that sound presentist and things that sound iso-
temporalist. Mullins’s evidence that Anselm was clearly and consciously 
a presentist is suspect. For example, Mullins notes that the way Anselm 
sets up the freedom/foreknowledge dilemma in a late work, De Concordia, 
sounds presentist. Perhaps. But the way he solves it sounds isotemporal-
ist. And, contrary to Mullins’s claim, Anselm never, anywhere, says that 
God knows the future by knowing Himself. Mullins quotes Monologion 
22: God’s eternity does not “leak away with the past into non-existence, or 
fly past, like the scarcely existing momentary present, or, with the future, 
wait, pending, in not-yet existence.” Mullins says, “A clearer proclama-
tion of presentism cannot be found” (105). The Monologion is Anselm’s first 
philosophical work. Might he have changed his mind later? Moreover, 
just above the quoted text Anselm says that God must be present to all 
times and places. Most worrisome, a more literal reading of the Latin (in 
Schmitt’s critical edition: I, p.40, ll. 21–24) says that the past does not exist 
now (quod iam [my emphasis] non est) and that the future does not exist yet 
(quod nondum est). This is consistent with presentism, but it is also con-
sistent with isotemporalism. The isotemporalist, at any given time, holds 
that her past and future do not exist now in her present. The translation 
(from the Oxford World Classics edition, which Mullins ought to have cited) 
is misleading. A cursory outline of historical views would be acceptable 
if Mullins were clear that he is presenting one possible interpretation 
in order to move on to the philosophical case he hopes to make, but he 
adopts a tone of setting everyone straight (finally!) which grates upon the 
classical theist who is familiar with, and respects, his subjects.
Further, Mullins’s philosophical analysis of the set of classical commit-
ments is too quick. A striking example is his treatment of Aquinas’s claim 
that creatures are “really related” to God, while God is not “really related” 
to creatures. Mullins reads this as holding that the claims which look to re-
late God to creatures—He is Lord, Creator, etc.—are just about concepts in 
human minds and he quickly dismisses the Thomist distinction (119–122). 
Thomas’s doctrine is difficult, but even those who are not sympathetic 
to it will find Mullins’s interpretation lacking. Today there is a growing 
literature supporting versions of (or similar to) Thomas’s move, often ex-
pressed as grounded in an extrinsic/intrinsic distinction in the “proper-
ties” qualifiedly ascribed to God. If the move works, it may be possible 
to embrace all of the theoretical commitments that Mullins attributes to 
classical theists, including presentism, and allow that God can know what 
time it is. Maybe it can’t be made to work, but Mullins does not give it a 
fair hearing.
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Having rejected what he takes to be the classical theist view, Mullins 
moves to assessing theories which propose a timeless God and an isotem-
poralist creation (call this TGIC), and finds them wanting. Again, the argu-
ments, while often well worth considering, are too quick to make the case 
successfully. I offer three examples: First, Mullins says that TGIC entails 
that there is never a time when God exists alone without creation. And 
that is right. TGIC holds that time, like space, is a category of creation. 
But Mullins holds that this entails that the created universe is “co-eternal” 
with God (135). And since God is present to all of time, God is temporal 
(150–152). This is puzzling. On TGIC God’s eternity entails that God is 
wholly—no parts, no stages—present to every moment of time, just as 
God’s aspatiality entails that God is wholly “here” to every point in space. 
There is no place where God exists alone without creation, but I don’t sup-
pose Mullins would say that that makes the universe “co-aspatial” with 
God. Nor does the fact that God is “here” to every point in space mean 
that God exists as a spatial being.
Mullins notes (151) that subscribers to TGIC often make the spatial 
analogy. True. And he points out that time and space are not the same 
phenomenon. True again. However, he does not explain why the analogy 
is not apt. Time and space are categories of the created universe, both 
of which express a kind of limiting extension, such that temporal and 
spatial creatures (unless they are instantaneous or occupy only a point) 
cannot exist without being temporally and spatially spread out in time 
and space. That’s a severe limitation. The temporally and spatially ex-
tended universe does not share God’s eternity nor His aspatiality. (And 
this is why I strongly suggest that participants in the discussion about 
God and time not refer to the isotemporalist view as “eternalism.” For two 
thousand years western theists have applied the term “eternal” to God’s 
mode of being. The recent move of referring to the view that all times 
exist equally by the term “eternalism” muddies the waters. I do not say 
that it is just language that leads Mullins to his conclusion here, but that 
may contribute.) Classical theists understand creation ex nihilo to be God’s 
making things to exist, and so, even though they may accept that there is a 
first day in time, they hold that an infinite past is entirely consistent with 
creation ex nihilo. Mullins says that this is not the biblical view, but we all 
agree that the Bible allows interpretation.
A second issue is Mullins’s claim (137–143) that TGIC leads to a modal 
collapse; it makes God’s eternal act, and hence creation and all that that 
entails, necessary. And that’s a problem! I applaud Mullins for appreciat-
ing and pressing this claim, but there are moves to make, and he does not 
give them a hearing. One might avoid the modal collapse if one works 
with the distinction, made in the contemporary literature and mentioned 
above, between the extrinsic and intrinsic “properties” of God. Or one 
might bite the bullet on the modal collapse. There is a long and respectable 
tradition of holding that God does the best. Couldn’t God do otherwise? 
Sure, if He wanted to. But in His perfect and self-diffusive goodness, He 
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doesn’t want to. Mullins assumes that God must be able to do otherwise 
in some libertarian sense. And that is a popular position. But in the context 
he could at least mention—with some primary and secondary citations—
that other opinions are possible.
A third example where Mullins’s arguments seem facile is in his discus-
sion of the Incarnation. He first proposes to explain, not just assert, the doc-
trine of the Incarnation as promulgated by the ecumenical councils (166). 
Throughout the book he complains about the thesis that some doctrine 
might be an “impenetrable mystery.” I would suppose that anyone who 
had taught philosophy grants that a doctrine might be intrinsically coher-
ent, and well-explained to an audience, and yet members of the audience 
still find the doctrine to be an impenetrable mystery. The view that this 
couldn’t or shouldn’t happen with the Holy Spirit’s guidance of Christ’s 
Church met in council needs more of an argument than Mullins gives to it.
He proposes to examine the “Two-minds” theory of Christ’s one person 
with two natures. Traditionally the way the Incarnation is expressed is 
that the Second Person of the Trinity, the Son, “assumed” a human nature, 
a human body and soul. (Talk of “minds” is anachronistic, of course, but 
that is a minor issue.) But, says Mullins, we must reject this approach be-
cause Thomas P. Flint’s explanation of the doctrine of assumption leads to 
Nestorianism, the heretical view that Christ is two persons, not one person 
with two natures. And Flint’s idiosyncratic, Molinist way of explaining the 
assumption does seem Nestorian. Flint says that a human soul and body 
might or might not be assumed, and if it is it’s not a person and if it isn’t 
it is a person. The more standard expression of assumption holds that the 
soul and body assumed by the Son could not possibly be someone else’s 
soul and body, any more than Rogers’s soul and body could be someone 
else’s. The thought is just incoherent.
Mullins might have devoted more time to an examination of the stan-
dard approach. Instead, he opts for a different relationship. “To say that 
the Son is human is to say that He is appropriately related to a human 
organism or body . . . If the second divine person is embodied in a par-
ticular human organism, He will be a human person” (179–180). If I am 
understanding Mullins, this is not Apollinarianism—the heresy which 
holds that the divine mind is the thinker in the human body—since the 
divine mind and the human mind are both in there. Mullins spells out 
general, limiting, criteria for any mind to be embodied. For example, “The 
mind acquires perceptual knowledge as mediated through the body” 
(180). But a timeless divine mind cannot meet these criteria. “The divine 
mind as timeless and omniscient cannot acquire any knowledge” (191). 
And “If a timeless divine mind cannot be incarnate, Christians must give 
up belief in timeless divine minds” (192). But Mullins, contrary to (what 
I had thought was) his intention is rejecting the conciliar understanding. 
On his view, the Son is embodied and embodiment is so limiting that the 
Son Incarnate is not timeless or omniscient or omnipotent. How, then, is He 
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divine? Chalcedon holds that the Son does not abandon or lose His divine 
nature when Incarnate.
These three examples are representative of the philosophical analysis 
as a whole. There are many useful ideas, interesting connections, and 
provocative arguments, but all are presented too quickly, debatable as-
sumptions are taken as settled, and alternative or opposing views are not 
given a careful hearing. The book is a good read as a step in the debate, 
but hardly—as Mullins’s tone throughout would suggest—the end of the 
debate. The timeless God is safe . . . at least for the present.
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The Hiddenness Argument: Philosophy’s New Challenge to Belief in God, by J. L. 
Schellenberg. Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. x + 142. $35.00 (hardcover).
CHRIS TUCKER, College of William and Mary
John Schellenberg almost singlehandedly brought the problem of divine 
hiddenness, or the hiddenness argument, to the attention of academic phi-
losophers. But why stop with that stodgy lot? His latest book The Hidden-
ness Argument aims “to provide an accessible, brief, but vigorous statement 
of the hiddenness argument and an explanation of the associated issues 
designed for wide consumption” (ix). Freshman philosophy students 
could understand and benefit from this book. It is ideal for introductions 
to philosophy or undergraduate courses in the philosophy of religion. I 
myself enjoyed reading it and recommend it to academic philosophers as 
an introduction to the issues.
The book has eight chapters, as well as a short coda and a relatively 
comprehensive list of recent work on the hiddenness argument (making it 
all the more helpful for philosophy students). Chapter 1 lays out the basic 
critical thinking tools and vocabulary needed to appreciate the hidden-
ness argument. This material, while presented well, is unavoidably dry. 
This book would have engaged an even wider audience had this material 
been saved until later, say, just before discussion of the argument’s first 
premise. Chapter 2 identifies the sort of theism at issue, but it isn’t crucial 
to a basic understanding of the argument. Chapter 3 is my favorite. Its 
main goal is to explain why the hiddenness argument was only discov-
ered in the late twentieth century rather than centuries before. The most 
useful function of the chapter, however, is that it allows the reader to see, 
in engaging fashion, how Schellenberg’s argument is distinct from its pre-
decessors.
